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A law school dean once asked me to suggest a restaurant for a 
dinner meeting. I named a place, but told him that we could go 
somewhere else if he objected to northern Italian cuisine. "In my 
book," he replied, "anyone who objects to northern Italian should 
start over." That struck me as surely right: Not liking northern Italian 
food must be as good an indication as any that you have made too 
many wrong turns and that you might as well put all your efforts down 
as a failure. 
Government regulators would do well to follow simple heuristics 
like that. Writing good regulations - "good" in the sense of 
promoting the public interest - always presents challenges. 
Regulators must hit a small but important target where private 
conduct is brought within appropriate government control, but 
unnecessary compliance burdens and other deadweight costs are 
minimized. Even if they see the government's objectives clearly, 
regulators often have only a limited understanding of the underlying 
private activities. Moreover, regulators may be unaware of how their 
rules disrupt or distort those activities in socially harmful ways. 
• Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. Many thanks to 
Ethan Yale for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
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Regulators occasionally hit the target exactly. More often, they 
miss - though not by an intolerably wide margin (good enough for 
government work, as the saying goes). However, sometimes regulators 
miss the mark so badly that the only responsible next step is to 
acknowledge the failure. That is the case with the final regulations 
under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 409A.1 Those 
regulations are irreparably flawed - so flawed that the best members 
of the practicing bar cannot make sense of them for basic transactions. 
When the government issues rules that even experts cannot 
understand, the government should start over. 
I. A BAD BEGINNING 
In fairness to the regulators who wrote the section 409A 
regulations, the statute itself is fundamentally unsound. I had all too 
close a look at the legislative problems when I was part of the 
Treasury team that provided technical advice to the Congressional 
staff who drafted section 409A. Although staffers added the worst 
feature - the 20% penalty tax on "bad" deferred compensation -
after I left government, the wheels came off early in the process. 
Without question, I share responsibility for the poor legislative 
product. 
Section 409A was originally intended to serve two objectives. 
First, members of Congress wanted to eliminate "haircut" 
distributions under corporate deferred compensation plans. Those 
members objected to the constructive-receipt rule that allowed a 
corporate manager to take a premature distribution of deferred 
compensation as long as the manager forfeited part of the total 
deferral. The mandate to Ways and Means staff was to draft 
legislation that would ban haircuts. Second, Treasury wanted to bring 
order to the general constructive-receipt rules.2 A quarter-century 
moratorium on rulemaking in the area prevented Treasury from 
narrowing the application of the constructive-receipt doctrine for 
deferred compensation,3 and we saw the haircut legislation as a 
vehicle for setting boundaries around what was permissible. For this 
reason, we encouraged Congressional staff to include rules about 
1 Application of Section 409A to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 
72 Fed Reg.19234 (Apr.17, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.P.R. pt. 1). 
2 See Enron Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 
(2003) (statement of Pamela Olson, Assistant Sec'y, Tax Pol'y, Dep't of the 
Treasury). 
3 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). 
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deferral and distribution elections. 
However, there are always those at the table with other 
objectives. In this case, certain staffers wanted to add a strong punitive 
element to the draft legislation. In their view, a corporate manager 
who exercised too much control over when her compensation would 
become taxable should be treated more harshly than a corporate 
manager who had chosen not to defer her compensation in the first 
instance. By contrast, Treasury argued that taxing "bad" deferred 
compensation more heavily than current compensation was not 
sensible tax policy. As a compromise, the draft legislation included an 
interest charge on deferred compensation that failed the new rules. 
The theory was that the interest charge would treat "bad" deferred 
compensation the same as current compensation (allowing for a little 
too much here and a little too little there). 
As enacted in October of 2004,4 section 409A fell far short of 
sound reform. Most importantly, section 409A failed to impose 
accrual-based taxation on all corporate managers who earn 
compensation in one year and receive it in a later year.5 Accrual-based 
taxation, which follows directly from the Haig-Simons definition of 
income, presents the correct result as a matter of tax policy.6 That 
approach treats deferred compensation - regardless of whether it is 
"good" or "bad" (in the sense of satisfying or not satisfying an 
arbitrary set of statutory requirements) - just like current 
compensation. In other words, accrual-based taxation eliminates the 
possibility of a tax preference for deferred compensation.7 It may be 
4 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 
1418 (2004). 
5 The statute does impose accrual-based taxation on managers with "bad" 
deferred compensation. 
6 See Michael Doran, "Executive Compensation Reform and the Limits of Tax 
Policy," (Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 18) (2004), available 
at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311113. The discussion there relies heavily on the 
analysis in Daniell. Halperin, "Interest in Disguise: Taxing the Time Value of Money," 
95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986). 
7 Daniel Halperin and Ethan Yale argue cogently for a special tax on the 
investment income of deferred compensation rather than accrual-based taxation of 
the manager. Daniel Halperin & Ethan Yale, "Deferred Compensation Revisited," 114 
TAX NOTES 939 (Mar. 5, 2007). If the special tax is to be collected from the 
corporation, however, it may not reach situations in which the corporation is not 
subject to U.S. tax. This would be a significant omission. The deferral of the 
corporation's deduction under Code section 404(a)(5) would have no effect in such a 
case, and the manager would continue to enjoy an unwarranted tax preference. If 
instead the special tax is to be collected from the manager, it is not clear how it would 
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that the Congressional staffers who sought penalty taxes for "bad" 
deferred compensation would have preferred accrual-based taxation 
in all cases,8 but that sensible starting point cannot justify the fallback 
they ultimately pursued.9 
In their misguided eagerness to tax "bad" deferred compensation 
more heavily than current compensation, the staffers responsible for 
adding the 20% penalty tax ensured nonsense outcomes. Before 
section 409A, the tax law set up a defensible hierarchy for deferred 
compensation. Unfunded, unsecured deferred compensation would 
result in tax deferral if the manager was not in constructive receipt of 
the deferrals and current taxation if the manager was in constructive 
receipt of the deferrals.10 Funded or secured deferred compensation 
would result in current taxation of all vested deferrals, whether or not 
those amounts were constructively received by the manager.11 The tax 
results were harsher - current taxation of vested deferrals and 
current taxation of investment earnings on those deferrals - if the 
manager's deferred compensation was secured through a trust set up 
as part of a discriminatory plan.12 
Today, a manager covered by an unfunded, unsecured deferred 
compensation plan that fails section 409A is taxed more heavily than a 
manager covered by a funded or secured deferred compensation plan, 
even if that funded or secured plan is discriminatory.13 This stunning 
result calls for emphasis: A manager whose deferred compensation is 
protected fully from the corporation's creditors incurs a smaller tax 
than a manager whose deferred compensation, although not 
present any administrative or political advantage over accrual-based taxation. It is 
presumably for this reason that new Code section 457 A, enacted as part of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, imposes accrual-based taxation on 
deferred compensation for managers of offshore hedge funds. 
8 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., WRITTEN 
TESTIMONY OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION ON EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION AND COMPANY-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS OF ENRON 
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES, at 20 (Joint Comrn. Print 2003) ("The Joint 
Committee staff believes that [deferred] compensation should be includible in income 
no later than the time it is earned unless there is a substantial risk of forfeiture of the 
rights to the compensation."). 
9 Halperin and Yale wryly observe that "[t]he rationale for the special penalty 
under section 409A ... hasn't been completely developed." Halperin & Yale, supra 
note 7, at 944. 
10 I.R.C. § 451(a). 
11 I.R.C. §§ 83(a), 402(b). 
12 I.R.C. § 402(b)(4). 
13 I.R.C. § 409A(a)(l). 
HeinOnline  -- 28 Va. Tax Rev. 227 2008-2009
2008] Time to Start Over on Deferred Compensation 227 
compliant with section 409A, remains exposed to the corporation's 
creditors. 
Consider the point from another angle. Congress applied section 
409A to offshore rabbi trusts because such arrangements may protect 
deferred compensation from a corporation's creditors.14 However, it 
did not apply section 409A to secular trusts even though such 
arrangements in fact protect deferred compensation from a 
corporation's creditors. Thus, the manager whose deferred 
compensation potentially avoids the claims of creditors incurs a higher 
tax than a manager whose deferred compensation actually avoids the 
claims of creditors. These glaring policy mistakes cannot be justified. 
Finally, section 409A substantially increases risk-bearing costs for 
corporate shareholders.15 By taxing a manager with "bad" deferred 
compensation more heavily than a manager who receives current 
compensation, section 409A inevitably increases the costs to 
shareholders of compensating the manager with deferred 
compensation. Rent-seeking managers insist on indemnification and 
gross-up agreements to cover the 20% penalty tax, and those 
agreements shift the downside risk of section 409A from the manager 
to the owners of the corporation. The phenomenon is no different 
from what occurred in response to tax sanctions for golden parachutes 
and compensation in excess of $1 million.16 Imposing a tax penalty on 
corporate managers for reaching their hands too deeply into 
shareholder pockets only encourages them to reach deeper still - so 
that shareholders cover both the manager's greed and the statutory 
penalty on that greed. 
II. A TURN FOR THE WORSE 
To tell the story of the Oxford English Dictionary, Simon 
Winchester used the charming title The Meaning of Everything. In 
writing rules under section 409A, the government appears to have 
seen its job as the regulation of everything. Even by the standard of 
tax regulations, the final section 409A regulations are very detailed 
and very complicated. However, there is little cause for the 
government to take pride in its effort. After defining an ambitious 
scope for the project, the government failed to supply the judgment 
14 H.R. REP. No. 108-548, at 342--43 (2006). 
15 See Doran, supra note 6. 
16 I.R.C. §§ 280G (disallowing a deduction for golden parachutes), 4999 
(imposing an excise tax on golden parachutes), 162(m) (disallowing a deduction for 
compensation in excess of $1 million). 
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and craftsmanship needed to make such a complex system work. The 
result is a tangled set of regulations that experienced, thoughtful, 
compliance-minded practitioners cannot understand. 
One important point should be made up front. The overriding 
problem with these regulations is not that they are too tough on 
taxpayers; indeed, on many issues, the regulators give more ground 
than they should. Rather, the overriding problem is that the 
regulations fail to provide effective guidance. The government tried to 
address all conceivable issues that could arise under the statute with 
detailed rules specifying outcomes to the last possible degree of 
particularity. Then, recognizing that many of those outcomes would 
be indefensible on policy or political grounds, the government made 
up numerous ad hoc exceptions (with outcomes under the exceptions 
also specified to the last possible degree of particularity). Although 
the government intended to squeeze any possible ambiguity out of the 
regulations, the approach had the opposite effect: Ambiguity is the 
one reliable constant as the rules, exceptions, counter-rules, and 
counter-exceptions pile up, trip over each other, and pull in different 
directions. 
Consider the deceptively simple question of whether an employee 
has separated from service. Under the statute, an employee's 
separation from service permits a distribution of her deferred 
compensation.17 One might have thought that, given the great 
diversity of the terms and conditions of employment, the government 
would have seen the wisdom in using a flexible standard here rather 
than trying to specify outcomes for every possible situation involving 
every employee subject to section 409A. And, in fact, the regulations 
give us a general statement that an employee has separated from 
service if the employee has died, retired, or otherwise terminated 
employment.18 That seems sensible enough, and many of us - after 
adding an example or two indicating that sham separations do not 
count - might have left the matter at that and moved on to the next 
issue. 
Instead, we are told that employment is not necessarily 
terminated just because the employee is no longer working for the 
employer. The regulations say that employment "is treated as 
continuing" while the individual who had been an employee is on 
military leave, sick leave, or other bona fide leave of absence.19 This 
17 I.R.C. § 409A(a)(2)(A)(i). 
18 Treas. Reg.§ 1.409A-l(h)(l) (2007). 
19 Treas. Reg.§ 1.409A-l(h)(l)(i) (2007). 
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treatment lasts for six months or, if longer, for so long as the 
individual retains a statutory or contractual right of reemployment 
with the employer. The regulators do not trust us to determine· 
whether a leave of absence is bona fide, so they specify that a leave of 
absence is bona fide only if there is a "reasonable expectation" that 
the individual will return to work for the employer.20 We are not told, 
however, who must have this expectation (the employer? the 
individual? either? both?), nor are we told at what point one 
determines whether the appropriate party does or does not have the 
expectation (at the start of the leave? during the leave? at the end of 
the leave?). 
Next, the regulations tell us that, if the leave period exceeds six 
months and the individual does not have a statutory or contractual 
right to reemployment, employment is deemed to terminate on the 
first day immediately following the end of the six months. This has the 
trappings of a hard-and-fast rule, although the general proposition 
about treating employment as lasting throughout a leave period 
suggests that the employer and the individual may contract around it 
by agreeing that the individual would have a right of reemployment. 
The regulations make clear that the six-month default rule can be 
extended to twenty-nine months, if the leave is because of a medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to 
result in death or to last for a continuous period of not less than six 
months and if that medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment causes the individual to be unable to perform the duties of 
the individual's job or of a substantially similar job. 
You might be glad that, if nothing else, at least you have slogged 
through the separation-from-service issue. But, at this point, you in 
fact have barely begun. All we have, so far, is a general rule defining 
separation from service and a quirky set of rules about leaves of 
absence. What about the myriad other ways that employment might 
terminate? Now, you get the general rule about "termination of 
employment," which is worth quoting in full, if only because it is 
characteristic of the muddled prose that runs throughout the 
regulations: 
Whether a termination of employment has occurred is 
determined based on whether the facts and circumstances 
indicate that the employer and employee reasonably 
anticipated that no further services would be performed after 
a certain date or that the level of bona fide services the 
20 /d. 
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employee would perform after such date (whether as an 
employee or as an independent contractor) would 
permanently decrease to no more than 20 percent of the 
average level of bona fide services performed (whether as an 
employee or an independent contractor) over the 
immediately preceding 36-month period (or the full period of 
services to the employer if the employee has been providing 
services to the employer less than 36 months).21 
Even that not-so-pithy sentence will not get you past the finish 
line. There is still more work to do. First come the facts and 
circumstances that feed into the determination. These include whether 
the employee is treated as an employee for other purposes (such as 
salary continuation and benefit plans), whether there has been 
consistent treatment of others who are similarly situated, and whether 
the employee is permitted and available to perform services for other 
employers in the same line of business. The regulations are careful to 
note that other (but unspecified) facts and circumstances may also 
bear on the determination. 
Next come the presumptions and the nonpresumptions, which, 
incidentally, are not properly coordinated with the general facts-and-
circumstances standard. These are built around the very dubious 
notion that employers can make precise determinations about how 
much any particular employee, no matter how high or low in an 
organization, works from year to year. If the employee's services for 
the employer drop to 20% or less of the average services performed 
by the employee during the immediately preceding thirty-six months, 
the employee is presumed to have separated from service. If the 
employee's services for the employer remain at or above 50% of the 
average services performed by the employee 9uring the immediately 
preceding thirty-six months, the employee is presumed not to have 
separated from service. Furthermore, if the employee's services for 
the employer fall between the 20% mark and the 50% mark, there is 
no presumption for or against separation from service. (I am not 
making this up.) Whether anyone can actually implement these rules 
- I believe that even the government will find them impossible to 
apply on audit - appears not to have occurred to the regulators. 
You are still not done with this issue, of course. The regulations 
state that the 20% mark is not fixed; instead, an employer can treat 
another level of "reasonably anticipated permanent reduction in the 
21 Treas. Reg.§ 1.409A-l(h)(l)(ii)(2007). 
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level of bona fide services" as a separation from employment.22 If the 
employer chooses this option, it must set out in writing a level of 
services greater than 20% but less than 50% that will serve as the 
threshold for presuming a separation from service.23 Apparently, the 
no-presumption zone would then fall between the percentage chosen 
by the employer and the 50% mark. Thus, assuming that an employer 
could actually administer these percentage-based presumptions and 
nonpresumptions, the employer could make limited adjustments to 
the scheme. 
No presumption is really a presumption unless it can be 
overcome, so the regulations have rules for that as well. We are told 
that the presumption against separation from service (that is, if the 
employee's services are at or above the 50% mark) is rebuttable by 
showing that the employer and the employee reasonably anticipated 
that the employee's services would fall to 20% or less of the average 
services during the immediately preceding thirty-six months (or full 
period of employment, if the employee has not been employed for 
thirty-six months). Similarly, the presumption in favor of termination 
of employment (where the employee's services are at or below the 
20% mark or any higher mark set by the employer) is rebuttable by 
showing that the employer and the employee reasonably anticipated 
that the employee's services would not fall to 20% or less of the 
average services during the immediately preceding thirty-six months 
(or full period of employment, if the employee has not been employed 
for thirty-six months). Apparently, the nonpresumption that applies 
when the employee's services fall between the 20% and the 50% 
marks does not need a rebutting rule; in any event, none is given. 
There are still more rules on this topic, including rules that tell 
you how to treat paid and unpaid leaves of absence for purposes of 
the presumption in favor of termination and the presumption against 
termination. On top of that, there are rules for determining whether 
independent contractors have separated from service, for determining 
whether individuals who are both independent contractors and 
employees have separated from service, for figuring out who the 
employer is, for dealing with asset sales involving the employer, and 
for handling collective bargaining situations in which employees work 
for more than one employer. Of all the verbiage on separation from 
service, my favorite passage is the requirement - buried about 
halfway through these pages and pages of rules and stated without the 
22 !d. 
23 !d. 
HeinOnline  -- 28 Va. Tax Rev. 232 2008-2009
232 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 28:223 
slightest hint of self-consciousness - that a deferred compensation 
plan must "specify" the definition of separation from service.24 How 
could anyone even hope to do that? 
In their current form, the regulations on separation from service 
provide a numbing amount of detail but very little payoff in actual 
guidance. Once one looks beyond the superficial determinacy, the 
regulations actually give nothing more than a verbose facts-and-
circumstances test. I cannot help but think that the regulators, if they 
had thought about what their rules actually say, would have concluded 
that they are unable to state categorically when an employee has 
separated from service. The permutations of possibilities in how 
employment is conducted and how it is terminated are too great to set 
forth a single rule, and it is na'ive or arrogant to try. In the end, the 
government might as well have given taxpayers the same advice that a 
cranky federal judge gave as he sentenced an eighty-year-old 
defendant to a thirty-year prison sentence. When the defendant 
objected that he was an old man and could not serve thirty years, the 
judge replied, "Do the best you can." 
If the tortured-but-vacuous definition of "separation from 
service" stood alone in these regulations, one could chuckle and move 
on. However, there are two hundred pages of still more byzantine 
rules. The result of all this hyper-specificity is, of course, exactly the 
opposite of what the government intended. Rather than remove 
ambiguities and uncertainties, the regulators have multiplied them; 
rather than answer every question, they have raised many additional 
and unnecessary issues; rather than translate legislative language into 
a workable and administrable set of regulations, they have rendered a 
provision with very serious consequences into an unworkable mess. 
The best members of the practicing bar are at a loss to make sense 
of these rules for many commonplace transactions. The regulations do 
not give the coherent and sensible guidance that regulations must 
provide. Rather than own up to the shortcoming, the government has 
retreated into a "no-rule" position on the regulations.25 In effect, after 
failing in its responsibility to provide usable guidance through the 
rulemaking process, the government now refuses to address the many 
questions, ambiguities, and outright inconsistencies that it has created 
in any forum other than audit and litigation. With exquisite irony, the 
regulators urge taxpayers to accommodate the convoluted regulations 
24 ld. 
25 Rev. Proc. 2008-61, 2008-421.R.B. 934. 
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by avoiding "complicated" deferral arrangements.26 They have missed 
the point altogether: The regulations do not give effective guidance 
even for simple deferral arrangements. 
The regulators should understand these problems by now. After 
the final regulations were issued in April 2007, the practicing bar 
responded twice that its clients simply could not comply with the rules 
by the January 1, 2008 effective date.27 The government first 
postponed the date by which amendments to deferred compensation 
plans were required from December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008, 
but held the effective date of the regulations at January 1, 2008.28 That 
action, of course, was pointless. Difficulties in amending plan 
documents are not nearly as serious as the difficulties in complying 
with these problematic rules. The government finally relented and 
postponed the effective date of the regulations until January 1, 2009.29 
In the meantime, the sensible standard of "reasonable, good faith" 
compliance applies.30 
Ill. AFRESH START 
Congress shows absolutely no inclination to undertake a 
thoughtful revision of section 409A. At a minimum, that would 
require repealing the 20% penalty tax, which ultimately amounts to 
nothing more than a transfer of wealth from shareholders to the 
government with substantial deadweight costs along the way. Still 
better would be the outright repeal of cash-method tax accounting for 
corporate managers so that tax is paid as compensation is earned and 
vested. But those actions surely lie beyond the capacity of legislators. 
The responsibility for a second-best solution, then, falls on the 
regulators - the same regulators who so far have done just about all 
they can to make a bad law worse. 
By deferring the effective date of the final regulations, the 
26 Sam Young, No More Guidance on Nonqualified Deferred Compensation 
Plan Compliance, Official Says, 2008 TNT 24-6 (Feb. 4, 2008). 
27 See Letter from Ninety-Two Law Firms to Kevin Brown, Acting 
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Aug. 21, 2007) (on file with author); see 
also Letter from Ninety-Six Law Firms to Donald L. Korb, Chief Counsel, Internal 
Revenue Service, and Eric Solomon, Assistant Sec'y, Tax Pol'y, Dep't of the Treasury 
(Sept. 21, 2007) (on file with author). At the time those letters were submitted, I was 
(but no longer am) affiliated with one of the signatory firms. 
28 I.R.S. Notice 2007-78,2007-41 I.R.B. 780. 
29 I.R.S. Notice 2007-86, 2007-46 I.R.B. 990. 
30 /d. 
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government gave both taxpayers and itself an important reprieve. The 
government should use this time to consider very seriously its next 
steps. It would be a mistake to push forward with the current 
regulations; they are not a credit to the government and cannot be 
salvaged in their current form. The responsible approach - the good 
government approach - would be to acknowledge that the 
regulations have been poorly conceived and poorly executed, to 
withdraw them in their entirety, and to begin again. 
There are many ways to improve the regulations in the next 
round. I will suggest three. First, the government should limit the 
scope of the regulations to the group of taxpayers of greatest (and 
possibly exclusive) concern to Congress: corporate managers who 
form "top hat" groups within their companies and corporate directors. 
The statute on its face reaches more broadly, no doubt. But the 
government can continue the reasonable, good-faith. standard for 
union members, public school teachers, clergy, and everyone else 
outside the target group while it writes regulations tailored to the 
specific concerns presented by corporate managers and directors. 
Among other benefits, that approach would spare the government the 
awkwardness of penalizing elementary school teachers who want to 
stretch their school-year salaries out over twelve months.31 More 
importantly, it would simplify the range of situations that the 
regulations would have to cover in the short run. 
The regulators might protest that they lack the authority to limit 
the reach of section 409A. That argument is transparently false. The 
statute plainly provides that the government can prescribe regulations 
"necessary or appropriate" to effect the purposes of section 409A.32 
All the government needs to do is determine that the necessary or 
31 The Service magnanimously stated that, at least for the short term, it would 
not sanction school teachers under section 409A for failing to make deferral elections 
by the dates required under the final regulations. See Frequently Asked Questions: 
Sec. 409A and Deferred Compensation, (Aug. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroornlarticle/ O,id=172883,00.html. The deferrals involved are 
simply the pushing of income from one calendar year to the next when teachers 
choose to receive their school-year pay over twelve months rather than nine or ten. 
Left unexplained, of course, is why the Service did not exempt school teachers from 
section 409A in the first instance. School teachers electing to take their salaries over 
twelve months bear little resemblance to the corporate bandits who prompted the 
enactment of section 409A. A small measure of common sense here would have saved 
teachers needless confusion and the government needless embarrassment. But 
common sense remains in short supply. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-62, 2008-29 I.R.B. 118 
(describing expanded exemption from section 409A for teachers). 
32 I.R.C. § 409A(e) (2006). 
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appropriate rules for corporate managers and directors consist of 
regulations but that, for the time being, the necessary or appropriate 
rules for everyone else consist of the reasonable, good faith standard. 
Such exercises of reasoned judgment by the government may be 
infrequent, but they are not unprecedented: With considerably less 
statutory authority than it has under section 409A, the government for 
three decades took the position that it would not apply the qualified-
plan nondiscrimination rules to governmental employers.33 If the 
government redirects its focus under section 409A to corporate 
managers and directors, no one in Congress will complain that the 
government has shirked its duty by not taking down everyone else in 
the first round. 
Second, in writing new regulations, the government should make 
sensible use of broad and flexible standards. The over-reliance on 
rules in the current regulations is misguided. It introduces unnecessary 
complexity and sets up nearly endless ad hoc exceptions to 
accommodate specific situations. The definition of separation from 
service could have - and should have - been handled in one or two 
sentences with a handful of examples. The regulators' baffling desire 
to specify in advance the outcome for every conceivable case - which 
does not succeed in any event - increases the level of indeterminacy. 
Third, the government should simplify the regulations. The 
statute is not sufficiently complex to justify four hundred pages of 
regulations and preamble. Twenty-five or thirty double-spaced pages 
should have been more than sufficient to write coherent, 
administrable guidance. Rules of this length and intricacy do not 
promote compliance; they undermine it. Certainly, the statutory 
language of section 409A raises important interpretive points, and 
without any doubt, the government must discharge its obligation to 
interpret and enforce the law. However, that requires clarity of 
guidance, and the approach taken in the current regulations has failed 
to provide that clarity. The responsible next step for the government 
is to start over. 
33 See I.R.S. News Release, IR-1869 (Aug. 10, 1977). Congress ultimately 
codified this result for state and local governmental employers in the Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1977), and for all other governmental 
employers in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 
(2006). 
